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Abstract
There are many schemes in the literature for protecting digital data
from piracy by the use of digital fingerprinting, such as frameproof codes
and traitor-tracing schemes. The concept of traitor tracing has been ap-
plied to a digital broadcast setting in the form of dynamic traitor-tracing
schemes and sequential traitor-tracing schemes, which could be used to
combat piracy of pay-TV broadcasts, for example. In this paper we ex-
tend the properties of frameproof codes to this dynamic model, defin-
ing and constructing both l-sequential frameproof codes and l-dynamic
c-frameproof codes. We also give bounds on the number of users sup-
ported by such schemes.
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1 Introduction
There are many schemes described in the literature that aim to discourage the
piracy of digital data through the use of digital fingerprints (an extensive survey
is given in [1]). Most of these schemes involve splitting the data into segments,
each of which is marked in one of q possible ways. As in [6] we require that
these marks satisfy the properties of similarity, namely that the presence of the
mark should not be apparent when the data is used for its intended purpose,
and robustness, whereby it should be impossible for a pirate to alter or remove
the mark without causing a corresponding degradation in the actual data. In
what follows we assume that it is possible to create marks with these properties;
this is known as the watermarking assumption. For further discussion of issues
surrounding watermarking see [9].
If the data is split into l segments that can be marked in q possible ways
each marked copy of the data can be thought of as corresponding to a word
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xl) ∈ Ql where Q is an alphabet of size q. The set of words cor-
responding to the marked copies distributed to the users forms a code C ⊆ Ql.
A user who makes illegal copies of the data can be identified by the codeword
present on the illegal copies. It is possible that numerous users may cooperate in
the production of illicit copies, however. A set of users, known as traitors, who
collude to produce illegal copies of the data is known as a pirate. By combining
the segments received by different traitors the pirate can attempt to produce
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versions having different combinations of marks in an effort to avoid detection.
If a pirate has access to a particular set S ⊂ C of codewords then the set of new
words it can form in such a manner is referred to as the set of descendants of S.
Definition 1.1. Suppose S ⊆ Ql. We define the set of descendants of S,
denoted desc(S), by
desc(S) = {x ∈ Ql|∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , l ∃y ∈ S with xi = yi}.
The descendants of a set of words are all those words that agree in each
coordinate position with some word in that set.
Example 1.1 Suppose S = {(0, 0, 1), (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 1)}. Then
desc(S) = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 1)}.

By altering properties of the code C such as the minimum distance, it is
possible to affect the potential descendants of sets of codewords; this technique
is used in many schemes for preventing piracy. An example of this is provided
by traitor-tracing schemes, which consist of a code C and an algorithm that
takes as input a descendant x of some set S of c or fewer codewords (i.e. a
codeword produced by c or fewer colluding traitors) and outputs at least one of
the codewords in S. Traitor-tracing schemes were first proposed by Chor, Fiat
and Naor in [4].
If a descendant of the words belonging to a pirate set is a codeword cor-
responding to some innocent user then by producing a copy marked with that
descendant the pirate can cause that user to be falsely incriminated. Conversely,
a single traitor could distribute pirate copies of his or her version of the data
and, if caught, claim to have been framed by some other coalition of users.
Frameproof codes were proposed by Boneh and Shaw in order to solve this “toy
problem” [3].
The following definition of a frameproof code appears in [1]; Boneh and
Shaw’s original definition differs slightly as they used different assumptions on
the ability of the pirate to alter watermarks.
Definition 1.2. A code C ⊆ Ql is a c-frameproof code if every set S ⊂ C with
|S| ≤ c satisfies desc(S) ∩ C = S.
Thus when a c-frameproof code is used to fingerprint data no set of c or fewer
traitors can collude to frame a user outside of that set. If a code is c-frameproof
for all c ≥ 2 we refer to it as a frameproof code.
Example 1.2 The following code Γ is a binary, length 3, 2-frameproof code.
Γ = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)}
Any two words of Γ agree in at most one coordinate. Thus for any pair S of
words from Γ and any word x ∈ Γ \ S the word x has at least one coordinate
position in which it differs from both words in S so x /∈ desc(S). Hence no pair
of words can frame a third word. 
A result of Cohen and Encheva [5] provides a lower bound on the maximum
number of words possible in a q-ary length l c-frameproof code: for l ≥ 2
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and c ≥ 2 and prime-power q ≥ l they use error correcting codes to construct
c-frameproof codes containing qd lce codewords. On the other hand, Staddon et
al. show that for a q-ary length l c-frameproof code the number n of codewords
is bounded by n ≤ cqd lce [8]. For many choices of parameter better bounds
are known (see [1] for details), although in many cases tight bounds have yet
to be established. For the case of frameproof codes, however, Blackburn [2]
gives a construction of q-ary length l frameproof codes containing n = l(q − 1)
codewords and shows that no larger frameproof code exists for q ≥ 2 and l ≥ 2.
As in the case of traitor-tracing schemes the words of a frameproof code
are embedded in the data, which is then distributed; any information about
the pirates is obtained after the piracy has occurred, through the examina-
tion of the pirate copies of the data. We refer to this as the static model. In
[6] Fiat and Tassa introduce dynamic traitor-tracing schemes, which make use
of fingerprintinging in the digital broadcast setting where data is continuously
broadcast to paying recipients. This could correspond to the output of a pay TV
station, for example. In this dynamic setting the data is divided into segments,
each corresponding to a few minutes of the broadcast. Digital fingerprints are
added to each segment, with q differently-marked versions of each segment be-
ing produced. At a given time the appropriate segment is broadcast after being
encrypted in such a way that each user can only decrypt a particular marked
version so that different users receive differently-marked versions of each seg-
ment. We model this by using an alphabet Q of size q to represent the possible
segments; a user u is therefore effectively allocated a symbol Mj(u) ∈ Q during
time segment j.
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Figure 1: Piracy of a Fingerprinted Digital Broadcast
A set T of traitorous users who collaborate in piracy have the choice at each
time i of broadcasting any segment with a mark received by one of the traitors
at that time (i.e. a mark ξi ∈ {Mi(t)|t ∈ T}). We say that a pirate broadcast se-
quence corresponding to T is a sequence {ξi}ji=1 such that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , j
the mark ξi is in the set {Mi(t)|t ∈ T}. If the legitimate broadcaster can inter-
cept the pirate’s broadcast it can detect the sequence of marks broadcast by the
pirate and use it to determine how to distribute the differently marked versions
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to the users at future times. For the sake of brevity we represent the pirate
sequence {ξi}j−1i=1 by the word Ξj = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξj−1) ∈ Qj−1.
A dynamic traitor-tracing scheme distributes the marks in such a way that
the identities of the traitors are revealed by the pirate broadcast. In a sequential
traitor-tracing scheme, as introduced by Safavi-Naini and Wang in [7], the mark
distribution is not dependent on the pirate broadcast, which is used solely to
identify the traitors.
It is shown in [6], however, that in order to trace even one traitor a determin-
istic dynamic traitor tracing scheme requires the use of at least c+ 1 differently
marked variants, where c is the number of colluding traitors. If the number
of traitors is high the broadcaster may not have the resources to produce the
required number of versions. One approach in this situation would be to use
a probabilistic scheme, as suggested in [10]; another option, which we explore
here, is to consider a weaker model.
This paper examines the possibility of extending the properties of frameproof
codes to the dynamic broadcast setting. In this setting we say that a pirate
T who broadcasts a sequence {ξi}ji=1 has framed a user u ∈ U \ T during
time segment i ≤ j if ξi = Mi(u). We say that T frames u over the interval
i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ l − 1 of length l if ξα = Mα(u) for all α = i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ l − 1.
We will investigate methods for preventing framing in the dynamic setting.
The resulting schemes may be of less practical use than a corresponding traitor
tracing scheme, but it is nonetheless interesting to study their behaviour in
comparison with that of ordinary frameproof codes.
In Section 2 we define l-sequential c-frameproof codes that prevent the fram-
ing of innocent users by coalitions of up to c traitors over windows of l consecu-
tive segments. These schemes do not depend on the pirate broadcast. We then
show that these schemes are closely related to the static c-frameproof codes,
and use this connection to bound the maximum number of users such schemes
can support.
Section 3 contains an exploration of l-dynamic c-frameproof codes, which
require l time segments to prevent coalitions of up to c traitors from framing
innocent users. By exploiting the information present in the pirate broadcast
these schemes can protect an exponentially greater number of users than an
l-sequential c-frameproof code. We show that for c ≥ 2 the maximum number of
users that such a scheme can protect is equal to ql−1(q−1), and that when there
is at most one traitor ql users can be protected. We also describe constructions
of schemes meeting each of these bounds.
2 Sequential Frameproof Codes
The aim of a sequential traitor tracing scheme is to distribute differently marked
versions to the users in such a way that once the pirate broadcast is received
a traitor can be identified. In the context of frameproof codes, however, our
goal is to distribute segments so as to prevent the pirate from broadcasting a
sequence of segments corresponding to that allocated to an innocent user. This
concept is expressed formally in the following definition.
Definition 2.1. Let U be a set of users. An l-sequential c-frameproof code is
a function M mapping N+ × U to Q with (j, u) 7→ Mj(u), such that for any
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pirate T ⊂ U with |T | ≤ c, any i ∈ N+ and for any sequence of marks {ξj}i+l−1j=i
broadcast by that pirate over l consecutive time intervals there is no legitimate
user u ∈ U \ T with Mj(u) = ξj for all j = i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ l − 1.
During time section j the functionM assigns to user u the segment marked
with mark Mj(u); the sequential c-frameproof property ensures that over the
course of any l consecutive time segments, the sequence of marked segments
broadcast by any pirate T with |T | ≤ c will differ from that allocated to any
innocent user. If M is an l-sequential c-frameproof code for all c ≥ 2 then we
refer to it simply as an l-sequential frameproof code.
If at some time t a user u receives a mark that no other user received at
that time we refer to it as a unique mark. If the pirate broadcast ξt is a unique
mark, then we know that the user who received the mark must be part of the
pirate coalition.
Example 2.1 Let U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} and Q = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and define M
by setting M(i, uj) = j for all i ∈ N+. Then M is an l-sequential frameproof
code for any l ≥ 1, since the fact that no two users get the same mark at any
time means that no user can be framed during any time interval. 
The rather trivial code described above requires a mark alphabet of size n. If
fewer marks are available then a more sophisticated construction is necessary in
order to prevent framing. In fact l-sequential c-frameproof codes are essentially
familiar objects in a new guise:
Theorem 2.2. A q-ary l-sequential c-frameproof code supporting n users ex-
ists if and only if there exists a q-ary length l c-frameproof code containing n
codewords.
Proof. Suppose M is an l-sequential c-frameproof code over an alphabet Q of
size q protecting a set U of users with |U | = n. Fix some integer j ≥ 1 and
associate a word xu =
(
Mj(u),Mj+1(u), . . . ,Mj+l−1(u)
) ∈ Ql with each user
u ∈ U . Then it is straightforward to show that the set Γ = {xu|u ∈ U} ⊂ Ql
is a length l c-frameproof code over Q of size n. Conversely, for every q-ary
length l c-frameproof code Γ = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ Ql it is possible to construct
an l-sequential c-frameproof code by letting M : N+ × U → Q be defined by
setting Mi(uα) = xαi′ , where i
′ is the unique element of {1, 2, . . . , l} with i ≡ i′
(mod l).
The above result implies that bounds on the number of words contained in
a c-frameproof code translate into bounds on the number of users a sequential
c-frameproof code can support. In particular, a previously mentioned result
from [2] leads to the following bound.
Corollary 2.3. An l-sequential frameproof code with l ≥ 2 using an alphabet
of size q ≥ 2 can protect at most l(q − 1) users.
This relationship with the static case is due to the fact that in the sequential
setting neither the set of users nor the allocation of marked segments are affected
by the broadcast, which enables known examples of c-frameproof codes to be
effectively translated into the dynamic setting to yield sequential c-frameproof
codes. This example illustrates how this works in practice.
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Example 2.2 The code Γ of Example 1.2 is a binary, length 3, 2-frameproof
code. We label the words as follows.
x0 = (0, 0, 0), x1 = (1, 1, 0), x2 = (0, 1, 1), x3 = (1, 0, 1)
As Γ contains four words, it can be turned into a 3-sequential 2-frameproof
code for four users. Let U = {u0, u1, u2, u3} and Q = {0, 1}. Define a function
M : N+ × U → Q by settingMi(uj) = xji′ , with i′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i′ ≡ i (mod 3).
The following table indicates how the marks would be distributed according to
M over the first nine time segments.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
u0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
u2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
u3 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
If we consider any three consecutive time segments we observe that the marks
received by each user correspond to words of Γ, therefore it is not possible
for any two colluding users to frame a third user over any length 3 window
of consecutive segments. Thus we conclude that M is indeed a 3-sequential
2-frameproof code. 
3 Dynamic Frameproof Codes
The dynamic setting differs from the sequential case in that we wish in this
instance to make use of the information present in the pirate’s broadcast. Se-
quential frameproof codes are essentially equivalent to the ordinary frameproof
codes but the greater flexibility of the dynamic setting suggests a potential for
genuinely new constructions; in particular we would expect to find more-efficient
ways of preventing framing. Indeed this is the case, as we will show.
We assume that at any given time j we know the pirate’s previous broadcast
Ξj and we use this information to determine the allocation of marks at that
time. The pirate T responds by broadcasting a marked segment ξj received
by a traitor t ∈ T ; this mark is then taken into account when distributing the
marks at time j + 1. Our goal in this instance is to allocate marks so that after
as short a time as possible we can be certain that no innocent user has been
framed. We will therefore consider schemes that define a mark distribution over
l segments and prevent any pirate set from framing an innocent user over that
time period. We define this formally as follows:
Definition 3.1. Let U be a set of users and Q a marking alphabet. An l-dynamic
c-frameproof code is a finite family of functions {Dα}lα=1 where D1 : U → Q
and Dα : Qα−1 ×U → Q for α > 1, with the property that for any pirate broad-
cast sequence {ξj}lj=1 corresponding to a pirate T with |T | ≤ c there is no user
u ∈ U \ T with Dj(Ξj , u) = ξj for all j = 1, 2, . . . , l.
The function Dj associates each user u with a symbol Dj(Ξj , u) ∈ Q that
represents the marked version that will be distributed to the user u in time
j; the marks Ξj previously broadcast by the pirate are used to determine how
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the symbols are allocated. A family of such functions is a dynamic frameproof
code if it distributes symbols in such a way that for any pirate set T ⊂ U with
|T | ≤ c and any innocent user u ∈ U \ T no sequence {ξi}li=1 corresponding to
T will match the sequence {Di(Ξi, u)}li=1 received by u. In practice we wish l
to be as small as possible, in order to minimise the duration for which framing
can potentially occur. In the case where {Dα}lα=1 is an l-dynamic c-frameproof
code for all c ≥ 2 then we refer to it simply as an l-dynamic frameproof code.
Example 3.1 If M is an l-sequential c-frameproof code for user set U and
alphabet Q we can define an l-dynamic c-frameproof code {Dα}lα=1by setting
Dα(Ξα, u) =M(α, u) for all u ∈ U and α = 1, 2, . . . , l. 
This is a somewhat trivial example of a dynamic c-frameproof code as
the information contained in the pirate broadcast is not used; it is essentially
equivalent to an ordinary frameproof code. The following construction yields
l-dynamic frameproof codes that are significantly more efficient than those aris-
ing in this manner: they use an alphabet Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} to protect
ql−1(q − 1) users from framing in time l. We introduce the notation S1 = u
and Sj = {u ∈ U |Di(Ξi, u) = ξi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , j − 1} when j > 1, so Sj
represents the set of all users who have been framed over the first j − 1 time
segments.
Construction 3.2. For each j ≤ l− 1 divide Sj arbitrarily into q sets of equal
size Sj(0), Sj(1), . . . , Sj(q − 1) and define
Dj(Ξj , u) =
{
i if u ∈ Sj(i),
0 otherwise.
(for j ≤ l − 1)
Dl(Ξl, u) =
{
i if u is the ith member of Sl for 1 ≤ i ≤ min{|Sl|, q − 1},
0 otherwise.
At each time prior to l the set of users who have been framed so far are
divided into q groups that each receive a different symbol; at time l up to q− 1
previously framed users receive unique marks and all other users receive 0. Note
that the sets Sj satisfy
Sl ⊆ Sl−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ S1 = U,
and that for each j > 1 we have that Sj+1 = Sj(ξj), where ξj is the symbol
broadcast by the pirate at time j.
We observe that this construction does not depend on the size of poten-
tial pirate coalitions: in fact it can prevent framing by coalitions of any size
2 ≤ c ≤ n − 1, as Theorem 3.3 shows. We observed previously that an
l-sequential frameproof code can protect at most l(q − 1) users; this construc-
tion protects ql−1(q − 1) users, an exponential increase due to the increased
information available in the dynamic case. Indeed, even a length l 2-frameproof
code (and hence an l-sequential 2-frameproof code) has size bounded by 2qd l2e;
this shows that there exist l-dynamic frameproof codes that are asymptotically
more efficient than all l-sequential c-frameproof codes when q →∞, even when
c is small.
Theorem 3.3. The functions {Di}li=1 defined in Construction 3.2 constitute
an l-dynamic frameproof code.
7
Proof. During the first segment we have |S1| = ql−1(q − 1), so each set S1(i)
contains ql−2(q − 1) users. At time 2, since S2 = S1(ξ1) where ξ1 is the
symbol broadcast by the pirate at time 1 we have |S2| = ql−2(q − 1). Simi-
larly, when j ≤ l − 1 we know Sj = Sj−1(ξj−1), so |Sj | = |Sj−1(ξj−1)|, and⌊ |Sj−1|
q
⌋
≤ |Sj−1(ξj−1)| ≤
⌈ |Sj−1|
q
⌉
. This implies that for j ≤ l − 1 we have
|Sj | = ql−j(q − 1). In particular |Sl−1| = q(q − 1), so |Sl−1(ξl−1)| = q − 1, no
matter what symbol ξl−1 the pirate chooses to broadcast at time l − 1. Thus
|Sl| = q − 1, so precisely q − 1 users are framed over the first l − 1 time seg-
ments. At time l these users are assigned the symbols 1, 2, . . . , q − 1 and all
other users receive 0. It is impossible for any user u ∈ Sl to be framed at time
l therefore, since no other users have received the same mark, hence no pirate
set T with u /∈ T has the potential to broadcast Dl(Ξl, u). Hence we conclude
that no innocent user is framed over all l segments, no matter what the pirate
broadcast.
This example shows how this works in practice.
Example 3.2 Suppose l = 3 and Q = {0, 1, 2}. Then ql−1(q − 1) = 18. The
following table shows how the marks are allocated to the users according to the
above construction, in response to the particular pirate broadcast shown in row
T .
1 2 3
u0 0 0 0
u1 0 0 0
u2 0 0 0
u3 0 0 0
u4 0 0 0
u5 0 0 0
u6 1 0 0
u7 1 0 0
u8 1 0 0
u9 1 0 0
u10 1 0 0
u11 1 0 0
u12 2 0 1
u13 2 0 2
u14 2 1 0
u15 2 1 0
u16 2 2 0
u17 2 2 0
T 2 0 0
Here ξ1 = 2, so S2 = {u12, u13, . . . , u17}. At time 2 this set is divided into three
sets of size 2, S2(0) = {u12, u13}, S2(1) = {u14, u15} and S2(2) = {u16, u17};
all other users receive 0 at this time. At time 3 we see that S3 = {u12, u13},
so these users receive unique marks and all other users receive 0. Hence the
only users who were framed over the first two segments (u12 and u13) cannot
be framed at time 3, so no user is framed over all l = 3 segments. 
We have seen that the schemes arising from the above construction are more
efficient than sequential schemes; now we would like to know whether more
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efficient constructions exist. In the case of the sequential frameproof codes
greater numbers of users can be protected when the number of traitors is limited,
which leads to the question of whether bounding the number of colluding traitors
could produce more efficient dynamic schemes. We will see, however, that once
we suppose there is more than one traitor we do not in fact gain anything
by considering limits on the number of traitors: two traitors can do as much
damage as n − 1 traitors. The following theorem gives precise bounds on the
number of users that can be protected from framing by dynamic schemes.
Theorem 3.4. Let l ≥ 2 and q ≥ 2. A q-ary l-dynamic c-frameproof code
protecting n users exists if and only if
1. either c = 1 and n ≤ ql,
2. or c ≥ 2 and n ≤ ql−1(q − 1).
Proof. (1) Suppose there is only one traitor. If the marked segments are dis-
tributed so that each user receives a distinct sequence of l symbols then no user
can frame another. There are exactly ql length l sequences with symbols from
an alphabet of size q; if there are no more than ql users it is therefore possible
to allocate a unique sequence to each user. The resulting mark distribution
constitutes a q-ary l-dynamic 1-frameproof code protecting ql users.
We prove the converse using induction on l.
Let P(l) be the proposition that the existence of an l-dynamic 1-frameproof
code {Dj}lj=1 protecting a set U of users implies that |U | ≤ ql.
Then P(1) is true, since if there exists D1 protecting more than q users there
exist users t, u ∈ U with t 6= u who receive the same mark at time 1. Then t can
frame u at this time, contradicting the 1-dynamic 1-frameproof nature of D1.
Suppose P(k) is true for some k. Then every k-dynamic 1-frameproof code
protects at most qk users. Consider a (k + 1)-dynamic 1-frameproof code
{Dj}k+1j=1 and suppose it protects at least qk+1 + 1 users. At time 1 there ex-
ists a mark that is received by at least
⌈
|U |
q
⌉
≥ qk + 1 users. Suppose the
pirate broadcast consists of this mark ξ1; then |S2| ≥ qk + 1. If Υα is the word
(υ1, υ2, . . . , υα−1) ∈ Qα−1 denote by Ξα+1 the word (ξ1, υ1, υ2, . . . , υα−1) ∈ Qα.
Define a family of functions {Ej}kj=1 with E1 : S2 → Q and Ej : Qj−1×S2 → Q
by setting Ej(Υj , u) = Dj+1(Ξj+1, u) for all u ∈ S2. Then {Ej}kj=1 is a
k-dynamic 1-frameproof code protecting the users in S2, for if there exist users
t, u ∈ S2 with t 6= u such that Ej(Υj , t) = Ej(Υj , u) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , k
it follows that Di(Ξi, t) = Di(Ξi, u) for all i = 2, 3, . . . , k + 1. Since t and u
are in S2 we have D1(u) = D1(t) = ξ1, hence t is capable of having produced
the broadcast sequence that framed u over all k + 1 segments, contradicting
the assumption that {Dj}k+1j=1 is (k+ 1)-dynamic 1-frameproof. As {Ej}kj=1 is a
k-dynamic 1-frameproof code protecting the users in S2 it follows that |S2| ≤ qk.
This leads to a contradiction, hence we see that P(k)⇒ P(k+1), therefore P(l)
is true for all l ≥ 1.
(2) The existence of an l-dynamic c-frameproof code protecting ql−1(q − 1)
users is provided by Construction 3.2; the proof that c ≥ 2 implies n ≤ ql−1(q−
1) is very similar to the above proof.
Let P(l) be the proposition that the existence of an l-dynamic 2-frameproof
code {Dj}lj=1 protecting a set U of users implies that |U | ≤ ql−1(q − 1).
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To show P(2) is true we suppose there exists a 2-dynamic 2-frameproof code
protecting at least q(q − 1) + 1 users. At time 1 some symbol ξ1 is received by
at least q users; suppose the pirate broadcasts this symbol. At most q− 1 users
can receive a unique mark at time 2, so there exists some user u ∈ S2 and some
user t 6= u who received the same mark at this time. Let t′ ∈ S2 \ {u} and note
that t and t′ are not necessarily distinct. Then the set T = {t, t′} is capable of
having produced the broadcast that framed the user u over both time segments,
contradicting our initial assumption. Hence P(2) is true.
Assume P(k) is true for some k ≥ 2. Suppose there exists a (k+ 1)-dynamic
2-frameproof code protecting at least qk(q − 1) + 1. Then some symbol ξ1 is
received at time 1 by at least qk−1(q− 1) + 1 users. Defining functions {Ej}kj=1
as above we see that these functions constitute a k-dynamic 2-frameproof code,
for any two users t, t′ ∈ S2 who can frame a third member u of S2 from time 2
to k + 1 also frame u at time 1 since all members of S2 received the symbol ξ1
broadcast by the pirate at that time. Thus we conclude that |S2| ≤ qk−1(q−1),
which is a contradiction. Hence P(k)⇒ P(k + 1) so P (l) is true for all l ≥ 2.
Thus any q-ary l-dynamic 2-frameproof code can protect at most ql−1(q−1)
users, which implies that a q-ary l-dynamic c-frameproof code can protect at
most ql−1(q − 1) users when c ≥ 2.
We see therefore that framing can indeed be prevented in the dynamic set-
ting, whether or not feedback from the pirate broadcast is available. In the case
of l-dynamic c-frameproof codes the optimal number of users supported by such
schemes has been shown to be ql−1(q − 1) for c ≥ 2 and ql when c = 1. Fur-
ther progress in the study of frameproof codes is necessary in order to establish
optimal values in the sequential case.
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